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DISTINCTION BETWEEN CONSTRUCTION
AND INTERPRETATION OF WILLS
The interpretation and construction of a will is a complex process
which counts sometimes fail to recognize involves trwo distinct phases
in the judicial determination of the proper distribution of a decedent's
estate.' Interpretation is the process of discovering, from permissible
2
data, the meaning or intention of the testator as expressed in his will.
If interpretation discloses a clear and full intention on the part
of the testator, further inquiry is not necessary.3 On the other hand,
couats resort to the process of construction if the discovered intention
is partial or ambiguous and therefore inconclusive. 4 In pursuing this
process a court is aided by certain rules of construction or presumptions.5 In applying these rules the court is seeking to assign intention
to the words used by the testator, and is not seeking the testator's actual intention, for it has already failed to find this.6 In essence, the
court is attempting to formulate a permissible intent for -the testator
with the aid of rules of construction.7
A problem of property distribution under a will recently confronted
the Maryland Court of Appeals in McElroy v. Mercantile-Safe Deposit
& Trust Co.8 The testator, Walter L. Clark, died unriarried in 1941.
After making specific bequests in the first four items of his will, the
testator undertook to dispose of the residue in the fifth item. A portion of ithe residuary fund was bequeathed to the Mercantile-Safe Deposit & Trust Company, as trustee, to be divided into three equal parts.
The testator's sister and her family were named as beneficiaries of one
'Some courts have not recognized the difference between interpretation and
construction. Restatement, Property § 241 comment e (1940); Simes, Future
'Interests § 75 (1952). Today, however it is felt that it is helpful to draw a distinction between the two processes. In re Witmer's Estate, 3oi N.Y. 461, 95 N.E.2d 798
(1950); Thompson, Construction of Wills § 2 (1928); Schiller, Roman Interpretatio
and Anglo-American Interpretation and Construction, 27 Va. L. Rev. 733 (1941).
2Holmes, The Theory of Interpretation, 12 Harv. L. Rev. 417 (1899).
1
Atkinson, Wills § 146 (2d ed. 1953); Page, Wills § 3o.3 Bowe-Parker ed.
'Miller v. Equitable Trust Co., 27 Del. Ch. 282, 32 A.2d 431 (1943); Judik v.
Travers, 184 Md. 215, 40 A.2d 3o6 (1944); In re Taylor's Will, 115 N.Y.S.gd 375
(Surr. Ct. 1952); In re Walker's Estate, 376 Pa. 16, ioi A.2d 652 (1954).
3Judik v. Travers, 184 Md. 215, 40 A.2d 3o6 (i944); Nehlett v. Smith, 142 Va.
840, 128 S.E. 247 (1925)8In re Lummis, 1o1 Misc. 258, 166 N.Y.S. 936 (Surr. Ct. 1917).

For a comprehensive analysis and discussion of the interpretation and construction process see: Atkinson, Wills § 146 (2d ed. 1953).
8299 Md. 276, 182 A.2d 775 (1962). McElroy v. Mercantile-Safe Deposit & Trust
Co. will hereinafter be referred to as McElroy.

1963]

CASE COMMENTS

105

of these parts; another part was to benefit an only brother and his
family. It was this latter one-third part that became the subject of litigation. The applicable part of the residuary clause provided that
the trustees should pay the income from this part to his brother
Herbert for life, and upon Herbert's death:
[T]o pay said income.., unto his widow and any of his children
who may survive him in the proportion of one-third to the
widow and the balance to his surviving children until said
children shall have attained the age of twenty-one years, at
which time the trust as to such child or children shall cease
and the proportionate part of the corpus of this part shall be
paid to said child or children.... Upon distribution to the
child last attaining the age of twenty-one years the income on
one-third of this part shall be paid to my brother's widow during her lifetime; then upon her death that part of the corpus
shall be distributed under item Sixth hereof." 9
Then in the sixth item, the testator provided:
"As and when certain of the trust estates set forth herein shall
cease and the corpus thereof be available for distribution under
this item Sixth 'of my will, I direct my Trustee to divide same
into -three equal parts and to pay one part thereof unto each
10
of... [three named educational] institutions ....
The ,testator's brother, Herbert, survived the testator, but died in
1959 without children. This gave rise to the problem of -ho was entitled to -the two-thirds remainder interest of -the "Herbert" trust
which would have gone to Herbert's children had 'there been any
to qualify as distributees. The testator's heirs-at-law, who were the
adopted daughters of his sister and therefore his nieces, contended
that there was an intestacy. The widow claimed there was no intestacy
and ,that she was entitled to a life estate in the income of the whole
of the "Herbert" trust. The educational institution agreed with the
widow that there was no -intestacy, but argued that one of the "certain
of .the trust estates," referred to in the sixth item, had ceased, and that
the corpus should be distributed 'to -them as beneficiaries under the
sixth provision.
The lower court accepted the 'widow's contention, holding that
she was entitled to the income from the entire "Herbert" trust for
life. This decision was appealed by both the nieces and the educational
institutions to ,the highest court in Maryland.
The Maryland Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court's holdD182 A.2d 775, 777, na. (Emphasis added)
20Ibid.
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ing. In reaching this conclusion, the court utilized, primarily, two
well recognized rules of contsruction: (1) There is a presumption
against a general or partial intestacy where the will contains a residuary clause;" and (2) Where there are -two possible constructions,
a court will adopt that construction which disposes of the entire
estate rather than a construction that results in total or partial intestacy. 12 Applying these rules :to the words of the will that describe
the beneficiaries of ,the "Herbert" trust on Herbert's death, -the court
concluded that "unto his widow and any of his children who may
survive him" meant "to his widow; and if any of his children survive him." Further, the court concluded that the word "certain"
in the sixth item meant "any," so that ,the clause is read as meaning:
"As and when any of the trust estaites set forth herein shall cease."' 3
As a result of these conclusions, the court held the will to mean that
if Herbert died childless, the testator intended the widow to receive
the entire income from the trust for life, and upon her death the trust
was to cease and the entire corpus to be paid to the three named educational institutions.
Two members of the court, in a dissenting opinion, criticized the
conclusions of the majority as constituting an alteration of the words
in -the will. They felt that there was no ambiguity in the language
used and that -the will failed to dispose of two-thirds of the "Herbert"
14
trust. The dissent concluded that according to the plain meaning"'
'Payne v. Payne, 136 Md. 551, ii

Ati. 81 (192o).

'-Reese v. Reese, igo Md. 311, 58 A.2d 643 (1948).
rrhe heirs at law and one educational institution argued that "certain of
the trust estates" referred only to those trusts whose beneficiaries were fixed and
determined by being named or described. By reading the word "certain" as meaning
"any", the majority concluded that the will meant that on the termination of any
trust, not just those with fixed beneficiaries, the corpus would pass under item
sixth to the educational institutions.
14
Sir James Wigram defines the "Plain Meaning Rule" as:
"Where there is nothing in the context of a will, from which it is apparent,
that a testator has used the words in which he expressed himself in any
other than their strict and primary sense, and where his words so interpreted are sensible with reference to extrinsic circumstances, it is an inflexible rule of construction, that the words of the will shall be interpreted in their strict and primary sense, and in no other, although they may be
capable of some popular or secondary interpretation, and although the
most conclusive evidence of intention to use them in such popular or secondary sense be tendered."
Warren, Interpretation of Wills-Recent Trends, 49 Harv. L. Rev. 689, 69o (1936),
citing Wigram, Extrinsic Evidence par. 14 n.4 (4 th ed. 1885). The "Plain Meaning
Rule" received strong impetus in the United States from the decision of Chief
Justice Shaw in Tucker v. Seaman's Aid Soc'y, 48 Mass. (7 Met. 188) 199 (1843).
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of ,the words used by the testator, the widow should receive income
on only one.third of the "Herbert" trust, and that there was an intestacy as to the other two-thirds.
Both the majority and the dissent in McElroy felt 'that the testator's true intention was the primary consideration,15 but it is apparent from their opinions that each utilized a different approach
in arriving at his conclusion. The majority seemingly failed to recognize that interpretation and construction are separate and distinct
processes. Although employing some facets of the interpretation
process, the majority passed over this primary step of determining
the testator's true intention and formulated an intention for the
testator -through the construction process. The dissenting judges, on
the other hand, approached the problem as one of interpretation,
reaching a conclusion as to the testator's true intention by reading
the will within "its four corners." The dissent argued that the court's
only recourse was 'to interpret the testator's language in connection
with the unforeseen circumstances which arose, 16 and not 'to view his
words as ambiguous in order to avoid the interpretation process.

The majority seems to have placed great importance upon the presumption against intestacy. 17 As a rule of construction, this presumption has a definite function when there is a question of the testator's
intention which cannot be resolved by -the interpretation process.' s
It is reasonable to presume that the testator by executing a will intends to dispose of his entire estate, and not to die intestate as to any
part thereof.19 By applying this rule of construction in McElroy the
majority imputed to the testator the intent that if there were no children, 'the widow and ultimately the educational institutions were to
receive ,the full benefit of the "Herbert" trust. In order that the will
might effectuate this imputed intention, the majority read certain
words in the will to mean something other than the usual meaning
15It is an axiom that the ascertainment of the intention of the testator is the
controlling factor in construing a will. Williams v. Committee of Baptist Church,
92 Md. 947, 48 At. 930 (19o0). See 57 Am. Jur., Wills § 1138 (1948).
' 6Hebden v. Keim, 196 Md. 45, 75 A.2d 126 (195o); Sabit v. Safe Deposit & Trust
Co., 184 Md. 24, 40 A.2d 231 (1944); Perkins v. Iglehart, 183 Md. 520, 39 A.2d 762
(1944); Estate of Childs v. Hoagland, 181 Md. 550, 3 o A.2d 766 (1943)1
7'For cases involving the presumption against intestacy see: In re Paulsen's
Estate, 113 Colo. 373, 158 P.2d 186 (1945); Garacci v. Lillard, 7 Ill. App. 2d 382,
i3o N.E.2d 514 (1955); Payne v. Payne, 136 Md. 551, x11 Ati. 81 (192o); In re Fabbri's
Will, 146 N.Y.S.2d 276 (Surr. Ct. 955); Petition of Maybaum, 27 o App. Div, 1028, 63
N.Y.S.2d 85 (1946).
IIn re Ingham's Estate, 315 Pa. 293, 172 Atl. 662 (1934).
Lewis v. Payne, 113 Md. 127, 77 Atl. 321 (1910); Glass v. Morgan, 241 Pa. 240,
88 At. 424 (1913); Daniel v. Brown, 155 Va. 563, 159 S.E. 209 (1931).
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abtached to them. In effect, the majority was disregarding certain
words in the will, a practice usually employed only in the interpreta-

tion process.

20

In the interpretation process, the courts will look to 'the will as a
whole and interpret the words used by the ,testator to discern whether
their meaning expressses his intention.21 Some courts when interpreting the testator's language consider only the will itself.2 2 Others look
also to ,the circumstances existing at the time the will was executed,
including the testator's relationship to the beneficiaries under .the
will.2 3 Once the manifest intent of the testator has been ascertained
by -this process, most courts allow words in the will to be altered so
as to effectuate such intention.2 4 In England, words may be deleted
in the probate proceeding in order that the will may conform more
nearly to the testator's intention.2 5 Although the English view has
been adopted by some American courts in post probate proceedings, 26
most jurisdictions in the United States only allow alteration of the
words in the sense that the court may disregard words. 27 Both in Eng'Atkinson, Wills § 146 (2d ed. 1953).
"Grace v. Continental Trust Co., 169 Md. 653, 182 Atl. 573 (1936); Reeside v.
Annex Bldg. Ass'n, 165 Md. 200, 167 Atl. 72 (1933); Smith v. Gockrill, 170 Va. 42,
196 S.E. 681 (1938).
"Usually where the will contains no ambiguity, latent or patent, extrinsic
evidence of the testator's intention is not admissible. The courts will only consider
the will itself. Shipley v. Mercantile Trust & Deposit Co., 102 Md. 649, 62 Atd. 814
(1906). See Annot., 94 A.L.R. 26, 39 (1935)nMost courts hold that evidence of extrinsic circumstances is admissible to
explain an ambiguous will. Sabit v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 184 Md. 24, 40 A.2d
241 (1944). See Annot., 94 A.L.R. 26, 44 (1935).
2"Courts are reluctant to reject, supply or transpose words unless made necessary by the will as a whole. In re Trevor, 239 N.Y. 6, 145 N.E. 66 (1924); Blair v.
Shannon, 349 Pa. 550, 37 A.2d 563 (944); Tiffany v. Thomas, 168 Va. 31, 190 S.E.
101 (1937). See 4 Page, Wills § 30.25 (Bowe-Parker ed. 1961).
2In re Goods of Boehm, [1891] p. 247. In this case, Sir J. E. Boehm intended to
create in his will two £to,ooo trusts, one for each of his two unmarried daughters,
Georgiana and Florence. However, the will provided for only one of these daughters,
since the draftsman instead of inserting one clause in favor of Gcorgiana, and
another clause in favor of Florence, inserted the name of Georgiana in the second
clause as well as the first. Since there was proof of the testator's intention, the court
probated the will with the word Georgiana omitted in the second £so,ooo trust, so
that the designation then appeared as "my said daughter--- Boehm." The
Probate Court left it to the Chancery Court, the court of construction to decide
what word the testator intended to place therein.
'Mason v. Willis, 326 Ill. App. 481, 62 N.E.2d 135 (1945); In re Vismar's Estate,
117 Misc. 554, 191 N.Y.S. 752 (Surr. Ct. 1921).
"Most courts do not actually alter the words in the will, but only read the
will as if the words were omitted, Dulany v. Middleton, 72 Md. 67, 19 Alt. 146
(i890); inserted, Heald v. Heald. 56 Md. 300 (188t); or transposed, In re Gallien,
247 N.Y. 195, i6o N.E. 8 (1928). See Heden v. Keim, 196 Md. 45, 75 A.2d 126 (1950);
Buchwald v. Buchwald, 175 Md. 103, i99 At. 795 (1938) .
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land and in the United States, the courts employ -this procedure only
when the testator's intention is known from permissible data, and do
not resort to it upon mere conjecture as to what ,the testator might
have .intended.28 Consequenly, it seems doubtful whether ,the majority
should have disregarded words, since its only justification for passing
over the interpretation process was that it could not ascertain the
testator's intent from the permissible data.
It appears that even if the majority had properly reached the construction process, it has defeated that part of the testator's intent
which seems clear and unambiguous by applying the presumption
against intestacy. It was stipulated in the fifth item that "the income
on one-third of [the trust] shall be paid" to the widow for life, and
upon her death "that part of the corpus shall be distributed under
item Sixth thereof." 29 It would seem that these words could only be
interpreted to mean that the educational institutions, under the
sixth item, were to receive one-third of the corpus of the "Herbert"
trust. The majority, however, by its application of the presumption
against intestacy concluded that the educational institutions were ultimately entitled to receive the whole corpus. In effect, the application
of this rule of construction conflicted with the testator's intention
as illustrated by ,the fifth item.30 Therefore, it is submitted that the
presumption against intestacy should not have been applied, since
the primary principle of giving effect to the testator's intent is violated when a rule of construction -is put in competition with such
intent. 31
When the ,testator's brother, Herbert, died without children, the
gift of the two-thirds portion of the "Herbert" trust became void
since there was a failure of specified takers. 32 Generally, a void legacy
"Ickes v. Ickes, 386 Ill. 19, 53 N.E.2d 585 (1944); Grise v. Weiss, 213 Ind. 3.
I' N.E.2d 146 (1937); Perkins v. Iglehart, 183 Md. 520, 39 A.2d 672 (1944); Smith v.
Baltimore Trust Co., 133 Md. 404. 105 At. 534 (1919); In re Haber's Will, 281

App. Div. 383,

119

N.Y.S.2d 843 (1953); Kostos v. Anderson, 204 Okla. 655, 240

P.2d 7 3 (1952). See 57 Am. Jur., Wills § 1153 (1948).

2Emphasis added.
'Courts hold that the intention of the testator is to be ascertained from the
language of the Will. Robinson v. Mercantile Trust Co., i8o Md. 336, 24 A.2d 299
(9-12);Grace v. Continental Trust Co., 169 Md. 653, 182 At. 573 (1936).
"Himmel v. Himmel, 294 Ill.557, 128 N.E. 641 (1920): Burnett v. Goodyear, 329
Mich. 214, 45 N.W.2d 41 (195o); Robinson v. Martin, 2oo N.Y. 159, 93 N.E. 488
(1910); Miller v. Buchanan, 114 Va. 76, 75 S.E. 773 (1912). See 57 Am. Jur., Wills
§ 1135 (1948)'In re Kane's Estate, 161 Misc. 767, 293 N.Y.S. 39 (Surr. Ct. 1936), aff'd, In re
Kane's Will, 251 App. Div. 710, 296 N.Y.S. 1005 (1937). See Barnes v. Johns, 261
Ky. 181, 87 S.W.2d 387 (1935), a case involving the distribution of the remander in-

terest of a devise under circumstances similar to those in McElroy.
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passes under the general residuary clause, 33 but when the invalid
legacy is a part of ,the residuary estate, most courts hold that the subject matter becomes intestate property. 34 There is a view, however,
which holds that where -the residuary bequest was made to a named
class, a void legacy in -the residuum should pass to the surviving residuary beneficiaries. 35 It is clear, however, that the majority did not
view the residuary bequest as a class gift since it concluded that only
some of the surviving residuary beneficiaries were entitled to share in
the 'two-thirds portion of the "Herbert" trust. Therefore, as the testator did not make a provision directing the disposition of the twothirds part in the event his brother died wirthout children,3 0 all courts
would seem to hold 'that this portion became intestate property dis-tributable 'to 'the nieces as heirs at law.
In formulating the ,testator's intent, 'the majority implied that since
the testator made provision for the nieces in his will, he did not intend
for -them to receive an additional portion. Howcver, the same argument
would apply 'to -the widow and the educational institutions since they
were -also beneficiaries of provisions in -the will. Therefore, no inference should be drawn from the fact ithat the ,testator made provisions
in his will for each of 'the competing panties. They should all be considered to be on an equal basis in this respect, and the law of intestacy
should be ,the determining factor as to what distribution is to be made
of ithe undisposed portion of 'the estate. Intestate laws are the legislative judgment as to ,the just disposition of a decedent's estate not
distributable by will. In effect, the majority in formulating this testator's intent :through the construction process has employed a presumption to override a positive rule of law concerning void gifts.
Moreover, by adopting 'the "plain meaning" analysis of the language, as argued for by the dissent, there would have been no need
33Bridgeport Trust Co. v. Parker, 97 Conn. 245, 116 AtI. 182 (1922); Dulany v.
Middleton, 72 Md. 67, 19 Atl. 146 (1890); In re Allen, 151 N.Y. 243, 45 N.E. 554

(1896). See Thompson, Wills § 566 ( 3 d ed. 1947).
3Bronson v. Pinney, 13o Conn. 262, 33 A.2d 322 (1943); Leighton v. Leighton,
j93 Iowa 1299, 188 N.V. 922 (1922); Powers v. Godwise, 172 Mass. 425, 52 N.E. 525
(1899); In re Kent's Will, 169 App. Div. 388, 155 N.Y. 804 (1915); In re Pen-

rose's Estate, 183 Misc. 226, 47 N.Y.S.2d 732 (Surr. Ct.). See Atkinson, Wills §
140 (2d ed. 1953).

WCourts hold that the void legacy passes to those members of the class who were
in existence when the class was fixed. Strauss v. Strauss, 363 Ill. 442, 2 N.E.2d 699
(1936); In re Potter's Estate, 14o N.Y. 599, 35 N.E. 955 (894); In re Wood's Estate,
321 Pa. 497, 184 At. 13 (1936).
-Courts have given full effect to similar provisions. Eee e.g., Perkins v.
Iglehart, 183 Md. 520, 39 A.ad 672 (1944); Nelson v. Johnson, 354 Pa. 512, 47 A.2d
65o (1946); Lawless v. Lawless, 187 Va. 511, 47 S.E. 2d 431 (1948).

